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THE EVEN BALANCE.
BY JOHN NEWTON LYLE.
HOW is the balance kept even? By taking as much out of one
scale pan as out of the other, or by putting as much in one pan as
in the other.
These two principles are so glaringly self-evident that few con-
sider them worthy of a second thought. They are given a place,
however, among the axioms of a very remarkable scientific work
published at Alexandria in Egypt several centuries before the Chris-
tian Era. They were called "common notions" by their clear-
headed, common sense Greek author and were stated in the follow-
ing intelligible language: "If equals be taken from equals, the re-
mainders are equal; if equals be added to equals the wholes are
equal."
Has the truth of these two axioms ever been called in question?
Yes, by an entire school of mathematical aeronauts who for two
centuries past have been attempting aviation above the atmosphere
in which alone it is possible.
This school demands "that we can take indifferently the one
for the other two quantities which differ from each other only by
an infinitely small quantity or (which is the same thing) that a
quantity which is increased or diminished only by another quantity
infinitely less than itself can be considered as remaining the same."
The demand is represented as being used to increase or dimin-
ish one member of an equation, the other member remaining un-
touched, while at the same time the resulting equation is said to be
absolutely accurate.
Of course this procedure is in conflict with the two Euclidean
axioms quoted above.
The apology offered for this discourtesy to Euclid is that the
phrase "infinitely small" is used.
With deep regret the apology is herein declined for the reason
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that the "infinitely small" quantities of the hypothesis are retained
in the first member of the equation as dividend and divisor whilst
absolutely rejected from the second member. Are the properties
of quantity dififerent in one member of an equation from what they
are in the other?
Remember that we are dealing now with mathematical sym-
bols, not with fortune telling charms ; with self-evident truths, not
with statements neither self-evident nor true.
Has the phrase "infinitely small" as applied to mathematical
quantity magical virtue?
Remember we are mathematicians and not magicians.
Is the modern calculus a species of occultism or is it a demon-
strable science? Are its professors conjurers or scientific geom-
eters ?
The two Euclidean axioms to which reference has been made
are either true all of the time or false all of the time. They can
not be true a part of the time and a part of the time false.
A question of far-reaching importance in mathematics and phi-
losophy here arises.
Can the first dififerential coefficient be obtained by the use of
finite increments only, and without antagonizing the Euclidean ax-
ioms? This question was answered in the affirmative in the volume
of the American Mathematical Monthly for the year 1894.
The subject was discussed in two articles, the one entitled "Are
Dififerentials Finite Quantities?" the other, "The First Differential
Coefficient of the Circle."
There is unity in mathematical science. The modern should not
discredit the ancient but harmonize therewith.
The hypotheses introduced by both the German and the English
mathematicians to explain the processes of the modern calculus were
criticised relentlessly by Bishop Berkeley, who was himself a mathe-
matician.
The English mathematicians lost their tempers on account of
Berkeley's criticisms and stormed around in genuine John Bull
fashion. The phlegmatic school of Leibnitz, however, ignored what
Berkeley had to say respecting their transcendental, anti-Euclidean
hypotheses, and instead of meeting Berkeley's objections candidly,
honestly and bravely they did not meet them at all, but contented
themselves with disparaging his idealistic philosophy and tar-water
remedies which had nothing on earth to do wath the modern calculus.
This surely is a phenomenon. A land dominated by the idealism
of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel refuses to consider the objec-
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tions to the demands of De L'Hopital because of the ideaHstic phi-
losophy of the objector!
What Berkeley really did in a speculative way was to carry the
assumptions of the current philosophy of his day to their logical
conclusion. This conclusion was absurd from the viewpoint of com-
mon sense and proves the falsity of the premises from which he
argued. Berkeley, however, accepted both the false assumptions and
their logical corollaries and gave to the world his idealistic philos-
ophy. Whatever induced him to give to mankind his tar-water
healing system remains an unsolved mystery. He alleges in quaint
language that a patient once took an overdose—a quart of the potent
stufif—and "was wrought all manner of ways." The same objection
that lies against Berkeley's idealism applies to that of later writers.
From the viewpoint of common sense, Borden P. Bowne's conclu-
sions are as absurd as those of Berkeley. Consequently, his prem-
ises, which are of Kantian origin, are equally in need of revision.
Abundant industry and conscientiousness must be accorded to
both Berkeley and Bowne. They undoubtedly stuck to their -job and
laboriously evolved what was wrapped up in their initial hypotheses.
Their service to mankind was that of labor-saving machines.
The duty left to their successors is that of rectifying their premises.
Lobatchevsky, also, set out from false premises, reached absurd
conclusions, but whilst on the journey his premises underwent a
process of evolution so that at the end of the trip they could not be
recognized as the ones from which he started. The trouble with the
transcendental non-Euclidean is that he does not understand the
principles of even balance.
EDITORIAL COMMENT.
John Newton Lyle, of Bentonville, Arkansas, protests in the
name of common sense against non-Euclidean geometry, and quotes
literally some of the paradoxical statements of the advocates of this
theory. The problem is too complicated to discuss here, and there
is no need of entering into it, because a statement of it has been
made in the editor's little book Foundation of Mathematics, and the
gist of it has been recapitulated in his summary of the philosophy
of science, entitled Philosophy of Form. The significance of meta-
geometry does not lie in the refutation of Euclid. Euclid remains
as reliable as ever before. It merely proves that Euclid is not the
only possible system of geometry, and that other systems can be con-
structed which do not rest on the principle that parallel lines will
never meet except in infinity. One of the difficulties of mathematics
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is the conception of zero, and also in modern mathematics the con-
ception of the infinitely small, which latter has been not justly identi-
fied with naught, because for practical purposes the infinitely small
is a negligible factor. Our correspondent, Mr. Lyle, is quite right
that no amount of reasoning or suppression of reasoning can identify
the infinitely small with zero, but many paradoxes are based upon
this identification.
Our correspondent is the author of a brief manual entitled "The
Euclidean or Common Sense Theory of Space," and presumably be-
cause he found it hard to have a hearing, being, as he himself states,
'76 years young," dares The Open Court by assuming that it is a shut
court to him, but we gladly give him space for his article because we
believe that his views are typical of large numbers of thinkers who
stand up for common sense even in the face of the learned authority
of such original geniuses as Lobatchevsky, Bolyai, and their host of
followers.
